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ARTICLE

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

6-

JoNDEa OF CLA.xs, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 602: First departnent clarifies distinction between joint
trial and consolidation.
CPLR 602 provides that when two or more actions involve a
common question of law or fact, the court may order either a
consolidation or a joint trial. Since neither of these methods of
uniting actions is defined in the statute, confusion can arise as to
the nature and appropriate application of each. Generally, consolidation unites suits into a single trial, but requires realignment of
parties so that a-single judgment can, be rendered. A joint trial,
on the other hand, preserves the original alignment of parties with
the corresponding rights to open and close."
There are
separate
67
verdicts, separate judgments and separate bills of

cost.

In Padilla v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,s the appellate division,
first department, illustrated this distinction in a multiple-party
action arising out of a collision of an automobile with a bus.
Separate actions were commenced in three different counties, and
in the last of these, New York County, the supreme court granted
consolidation of all the suits.
The appellate division reversed the lower court on both the
method of joining the actions and the venue.6 9 It agreed that
common questions of law and fact existed, but held that organic
consolidation would both obliterate the plaintiff's choices of specific
defendants and serve to confuse the jury.70 A joint trial, on the
other hand, would produce all the advantages of a consolidation
without disrupting the original strategy of the parties. 1
GOCIn consolidated actions, the general rule is that the party bringing the
first action has this right, Gallagher v. Barth, 268 App. Div. 865, 50
N.Y.S.2d 473 (2d Dep't 1944), but exceptions to this rule are not uncommon. See, e.g., Kappa Frocks, Inc. v. Alan Fabrics Corp., 263 App. Div.
326, 32 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1st Dep't 1942); Diesel Installation Corp. v. NuBoro Park Cleaners, Inc., 262 App. Div. 969, 30 N.Y.S2d 207 (2d Dep't
1941).
0
WVidal v. Sheffield Farms Co., 208 Misc. 438, 141 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1955).
6829 App. Div. 2d 495, 288 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't 1968).
69 The appellate division disagreed with the supreme court's decision that
venue should be where the majority of plaintiffs commenced their action.
Looking to the convenience of witnesses, the nearness to the site of the
accident, the respective trial delays and the county where 'the earliest suit
was brought, preferable venue was deemed to be in Onondaga County. The
test to be applied, said the court, was not whether change of venue of the
one action before this court would be justified, but, since a single place of
trial must be chosen, which county is most appropriate.
1o Realignment would be required here since the automobile driver's personal representative was a plaintiff in one action and a defendant in another.
'T Smith v. Witteman Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 793, 197 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th
Dep't 1960).
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Besides clarifying the frequently misunderstood distinction between joint trials and consolidations, this decision shows a distinct
preference for joint trials over consolidations in most multipleaction situations. Further, it offers a warning to the practitioner
to be precise in his use of language; when a joint trial is desired,
it should not be referred to haphazardly as a consolidation.
CPLR 602: Second department allows consolidation of action with
special proceeding.
72
the plaintiff sought to consolidate a special
In In re Elias,
proceeding to nullify a corporate election with a stockholder's
derivative action. Such a consolidation was prohibited under the
CPA, which provided only for consolidations of two actions or two
special proceedings.7 3 Supporting case law was provided by the
appellate division, second department, which held in In re Big W
Construction Corp.7 1 that lack of specific statutory authorization
barred any cross-consolidations of actions with special proceedings.
The parallel CPLR provision 7 5 when viewed alone appears
to be even more restrictive, since it speaks only of the consolidation
of "actions." However, this section must be read in conjunction
with the definition of an action in the CPLR, i.e., any form of
76
litigation including both traditional actions and special proceedings.
On the basis of this rationale, the CPLR has been construed by the
first department,7 7 and now, in the instant case, by the second
department, to allow consolidation of actions with special proceedings. No logical reason was found to continue to disallow7 s
cross-consolidations where common questions of fact and law exist.
It should be noted that an additional reason supporting the
persecond department's decision lies in the fact that the CPLR
79
mits a court to change the form of a civil proceeding.

7229 App. Div.
73CPA 96.
7'

2d 118, 286 N.Y.S.2d 371 (2d Dep't 1967),

278 App. Div. 977, 105 N.Y.S2d 827 (2d Dep't 1951).

75 CPLR 602.

CPLR 105(b).
7 Schuster v. 490 West End Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 535, 271 N.Y.S2d
171 (1st Dep't 1966) (mem.).
78In Hanft v. Hanft, 46 Misc. 2d 548, 260 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1965), the court, prior to the Schtster decision, chose to
follow Big W, and refused to allow cross-consolidation.
79CPLR 103(c); 2 WmnsTmw, KoaN & MiLER, NENW YoaK CrviL
PRACTICE ff 602.18 (1968).
"

